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The 1980s were a decade of extensive regulatory refc 'm.  Mac-
roeconomic and  allocative controls that inhibit competition,
innovation,  and efficiency were  "out."  Prudential  and other
controls that  promote  stability and fairness  were "in."  The
relative  costs  and  benefits of  universal  banks and financial
groups remain a subject of controversy.
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summarizes several papers that have already been issued as World Bank Policy Research Working Papers. Copies of
this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Wilai
Pitayatonakam, room N9-003, extension 37666 (May 1992, 38 pages).
Dimitri Vittas summarizes the findings of a forthcom-  (and pension) funds for financing large public sector
ing book on financial regulation that examines the  debts at below-market yields is being replaced by
policy issues of financial regulation and reviews the  investment rules that emphasize safety and profitabil-
experiences of both developed and developing  ity.
countries. He stresses the following ten points:  *  The most controversial type of control is still
structural controls that impose geographic or func-
* The 1980s were not a decade of deregulation, but  tional limits on the activities of financial institutions.
a period of extensive regulatory reform. There was  There is a worldwide trend in favor of universal
decreased reliance on economic regulations that  banking and even in favor of close links between
inhibit competition, innovation, and efficiency - but  banks and insurance, but less support for close links
increased emphasis on prudential and other regula-  between banks and industrial companies.
tions that promote stability and fairness.  *  Universal institutions pose a serious challenge to
* There is now widespread consensus on the need  regulators and supervisors. Countries with weak
for market mechanisms for monetary and credit  supervisory agencies would be well advised to
control and for allocating scarce financial resources.  promote simpler and more transparenL  structures.
* What  the best  speed  and sequence  of financia:  * There  is considerable  controversy  about the
reform  are remains  an open question.  The contrasting  desirability  and benefits  of universal  banking.  Many
experiences  of Japan and Chile  support  a cautious,  analysts  emphasize  the difficulties  of regulation  by
gradual  approach;  Indonesia's  experience  suggests  function  and of relying  on rules  of conduct  for
that  several  paths of -eform  may work.  overcoming  excessive  risk  taking,  conflicts  of
* There  is strong  consensus  on the importance  of  interest,  and the abuse of privileged  information.
prudential,  organizational,  and protective  controls,  These  analysts  favor structural  controls  that limit  the
and especially  on the need for capital  adequacy  and  scope  for fraud and mismanagement.  But other
for strong  banking  supervision.  analysts  argue that Lhe  threat  of regulation,  consider-
* There  is ample  recognition  of the importance  of  ations of reputation,  and provisions  for legal redress
speedy  and decisive  interve,ntion  to prevent  insolvent  against  offending  institutions  would  be effective  in
institutions  from magnifying  losses  and infecting  the  policing  universal  institutions.
rest of the financial  system.
* The role of &posit insurance  is still unclear.  It is  Vittas  concludes  by noting  that  most Anglo-
instrumental  in protecting  small  savers,  but otherwise  American  and Scandinavian  countries  currently  suffer
its role in preventing  bank runs,  promoting  competi-  from the consequences  of excessive  and uncritical
tion, or stimulating  better regulatory  mecnianisms  is  expansion  of credit as well  as from widespread
open to serious  objections.  mismanagement  and  a significant  amount  of fraud.
* The regulatory  issues  of nonbank  financial  He  argues  that if financial  problems  were to persist,
intermediaries  are similar  to those of banks.  For life  the case for imposing  portfolio  and growth  limits  for
insurance  companies,  price and product  controls  - prudential  purposes  might  merit  detailed  consider-
which  inhibit  competition  - are being replaced  by  ation.
solvency  controls.  In addition,  the use  of insurance
ThePolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Scriesdisseniinates  thc findings  ofwork  under  way  in the  Bank.  Anobjectiveofthe  series  l
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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The 1980s  have witnessed major and fundamental  changes in the scope and orientation
of financial  regulation. Governmentti  in both developed  and developing  countries have
engaged in an extensive rewriting of the rules of the game that govern the operations of
financial  institutions  and markets. Credit and interest rate controls as well as restrictions on
new entry and on the permissible  activities of financial  institutions  have been removed  or
substantiaUly  relaxed.  In their place, governments have established  prudential  and investor
protection  regulations  that aim at safeguarding  the soundness  of the financial system and
protecting the interests of users of financial  services, especially  the nonprofessional  investors.
Regulatory  reform has been associated  with-in many cases it has been prompted by-
major suctural  changes and innovations  in financial  markets. In many high income
countries, there is a clear trend towards universal banking  and a growing integration of
banking  and securities business.  Integrated  financial  systems raise issues in financial
regulation  tltt  cut across banking and nonbanking  markets. Two major issues regard the
stmuture of rei  :.tion and the role of market forces in monitoring  and controlling the
performance  o1 -.dividual  institutions.
In developing  countries, the dominant  position of commercial  banks, which are often
state-owned,  has been challenge] by the creation of non-bank  financial  intermediaries  and the
emergence of more active securities markets. This raises regulatory  issues that go beyond
traditional  concerns with the performance  and standing  of commercial  and development
banks.  However, commercial  banks are likely to continue to play a central part in the
financial systems  of developing  countries so that issues in bank regulation, including the role
of prudential  controls and supervision  and the resolution  of banking crises, will continue to
be of prime concern to policy makers.
1Whether financial  systems are dominated  by commercial  banks or are based on a
more diversified structure, an important  ingredient that shapes the functioning  and efficiency
of financial institutions  is the stance of macrofinancial  policy.  Failure to maintain
macroeconomic  stability has deleterious effects on the operations of financial  institutions.
This is true both at times of excessive  (inflationary)  expansion  and at times of coi1xCtive
contractions. Moreover, the pursuit of macroeconomic  and financial  stability may come into
conflict with the process of financial  innovation.
A related issue concerns the pace and implications  of financial  reform and the
transition from a system subject to financial  repression, limited competition  and directed
allocation of resources to one based on competitive  market forces operating in a stable and
well structured framewcrk.  The importance  of sustaining  macroeconomic  and financial
stability while implementing  financial  reform is now amply recognized  by policy makers.
However, questions regarding the pace and sequencing  of reforms are still difficult to
answer.
This volume of papers explores recent developments  in financial  regulation  and
addresses some of the issues highlighted  above.  The volume is divided into six parts: (i)
introduction  and overview;  (ii) general issues in regulatory reform; (iii) issues in financial
liberalization;  (iv) banking crises and restructuring; (v) regulatory framework  for banks and
other financial  institutions;  and (vi) regulatory issues in integrated financial  systems.
This introductory chapter provides an overview and summary  of the papers that
follow.  Its purpose is to highlight the main issues addressed in each chapter and draw
together the main lessons that emerge from the experience of different countries.
General Lssues  in Regulatory  Reform
Re-Writing  the Rules of the Game
In the first paper on general issues in regulatory reform, Milard Long and Dimitri
Vittas stress that the 1980s was not a decade of financial  dereg"lation  but a period when the
rules of the game were substantially  re-written.
2Long and Vittas note that the repressive regulations  of the post World War II period
were motivated  by widespread  dissatisfaction  with the functioning  and structure of the
financial  systems inherited from the colonial era and the Great Df;pression. Governments
used finance as a tool of economic  and industrial development  by taldng banks under public
control, directing institutions  to lend to selected  industries on subsidized  terms and keeping
interest rates low, usually below the rate of inflation. Although  the policies met some of the
government  objectives, they failed to create robust financial  systems. With the onset of the
debt crisis in the 1980s  and the ensuing  economic  recessions, firms in most developing
countries, especially  in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America, were unable (or
unwilling)  to service their debts.  Financial  institutions  became decapitalized  and technically
insolvent.
The failure of the traditional  model of economic  development  fed disillusionment  with
government  intervention  in resource allocation. This has been reinforced  by the recent
collapse  of centrally  planned economies  in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and
othe7  parts of the world.  As a result, there is now growing emphasis  on private sector
development  as an engine of stable and sustainable  growth.  However, to develop financial
systems that can finance their private sectors efficiently, countrLWs  need to restore their
financial  institutions to vitality, achieve and sustain macroeconomic stability and build their
financial  infrastructure  by developing modern  and effective  information,  legal and regulatory
systems.
in using regulatory reform for shaping  the structure of the financial  system, policy
makers can choose between alternative  models.  The historical  distinction  between bank-
based and securities-based  systems is less relevant these days as intemally generated funds
have become the primary source of corporate finance in most countries.  An important
differentiation  still exists between relationship-based  and transaction-based  systems, but in
developing  countries policy makers would be well advised to encourage, at least initially, the
creation of simple structures that are more transparent  and easier to manage  and supervise.
Long and Vittas suggest three criteria for evaluating financial  regulation  and structure:
stability, efficiency  and fairness'.  Stability is important  because unstable financial  systems
1  Key and  Scott (1991) develop a  "banking matrix" that  lists four policy goals of
regulation:  promotion of competitive markets, ensuring safety and soundness, avoidance of
systemic  risk and providing consumer protection. These are very similar to the three criteria
3have a large adverse impact on economic  activity.  Financial  stability can be enhanced  by
increasing  capital requirements  and strengthening  financial  supervision. But the stability of-
the financial system is also affected by its stru-cture. Systems with "narrow" banks or "non-
par" bauxs would be exposed to lower systemic risks.
The relationship  between structure and efficiency  is also complex.  In the research
literature the issues af economies  of scale and scope in finance still seem unresolved. In
developed  countries, there is growing concentration  and a spread of universal banking,
suggesting  economies  of both scale and scope.  Moreover, available evidence suggests that
concentrated  banking systems tend to have lower margins  and operating costs as well as
higher profits.  But in developing  countries, large banks tend to be inefficient. Their size is
the result of controls and restrictions  on competition  and entry rather than superior
efficiency. Allowing universal banking might exacerbate  the dominant  position of large
banks with adverse effects on competition  and efficiency.
Faimess covers many issues ranging from the protection  of users of financial  services
to the creation of a level playing field for competing  institutions  and the resolution  of
problems  caused by potential  conflicts of interest.  Faimess can be more easily achieved in
systems with simple structures, but limits on the permissible  range of activities of different
types of institutions  might undermine  efficiency  and, to a lesser extent, stability.
Long and Vittas emphasize  that there are tradeoffs between the three criteria and
suggest that there are no general answers to the questions posed by these tradeoffs.  Answers
must be sought in the context of particular countries on a case-by-case  basis, although it is
clear that extreme solutions that promote one criterion and totally disregard the others would
not be optimal.
The Rationale. Objectives  and Impact of Financial  Regulation
The impact of regulation  on financial structure  is the subject of the second paper in
this volume. Dimitri Vittas notes that regulation  is perhaps the most important determinant
of differences  in financial  structure exhibited  by countries at a similar level of development
and with access to common  technologies. He also notes that the main rationale for financial
of stability, efficiency and fairness.
4regulation is the existence  of market failure arising from extemalities, market power anqd
information  problems (Kay and Vickers, 1988). Market failure is a necessary but not
sufficient  condition for regulation.  The other condition  is that regulation  can correct market
failure in an e'fective and efficient way.  Much oi the debate among alternative theories of
regulation  is about the cost and effectiveness  of regulation  rather than about its rationale.
Externalities  include the risk of systemic  failure (the risk of failure of one or more
banks as a result of the actual or threatened failure of another), the infection effect (the
general lowering of st'ndards and prices caused by excessive  competition)  and network
effects (the costs and benefits of linking together competing  institutions  to a common
network). Other externalities  include the achievement  of macrostability  (to avoid distortions
in relative prices, incentives  and expectations  caused  by high and volatile inflation)  and the
enhancement  of the allocative  efficiency  of the financial  system (to ensure the financing of
projects and sectors, including small firms, with high dynamic efficiency  gains).  Concern
about market power stems from the fear that dominant firms may undermine  both allocative
and dynamic efficiency (the former by charging high prices and earning excessive  profits, the
latter by avoiding competitive  pressures).  Finally, information  problems arise from poor
price and product information, from the free rider problem, and from informational
asymmetries  between the suppliers and users of financial  services.
Vittas classifies financial  regulations  by their primary objective into six types:
macroeconomic,  allocative, structural, prudential, organizational,  and protective. There is a
certain correspondence  between types of regulations  and different rationales, although  most
regulations  have effects that cut across different purposes.  For instance, bank-specific  credit
ceilings are mainly applied for nlacroeconomic  purposes but they also restrain banks from
engaging in an uncontrolled  and imprudent  expansion  of credit and thus serve fulfil a
prudential objective.
Historical experience suggests that macroeconomic  and allocative  controls tend to be
ineffective  and inefficient. Macroeconomic  controls are often justified by the paramount
importance  of controlling the expansion  of credit and maintaining  price stability  and by the
absence of active money and government  bond markets that would allow the use of market-
based mechanisms  for monetary  and credit control.  But rather than relying on direct controls
that stifle competition  and inhibit innovation,  governments  should stimulate  the development
of money and bond markets.
5Allocative controls are motivated  by the need to finance sectors with dynamic
efficiency gains b 't limited or insufficient  access to credit facilities.  Allocative  controls are a
prime example of the argument that market failure is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for regulation.  Because  of poor design and deficient implementation,  especially inadequate
monitoring  of privileged borrowers, allocative  credit controls have failed in most countries to
achieve their objectives.
In contrast to macroeconomic  and allocative  controls, prudential, organizational  and
protective controls are necessary because financial  systems suffer from moral hazard, adverse
selection and the free rider problem, are susceptible  to imprudent  and fraudulent  behavior,
and are prone to instability  and crisis.  The main policy issut with regard to these types of
controls is how to devise measures  that are effective without undermining  competition  and
innovation  in the financial  system.
Structural controls are the most controversial  type of financial  regulation.  Their main
objectives  are to prevent excessive  concentradion  of market power, limit the potential  for
conflicts  of interest and discourage financial  institutions  from assuming  excessive risks by
expanding into areas that are remote from their main focus of operations and expertise. But
structural controls are often motivated  by political considerations,  such as preserving the
dominant position of domestic banks or protecting the turfs of different types of financial
institutions.
Structural controls may cause a fragmentation  of the financial  system into a large
number of small institutions  with limited capital resources.  This is likely to increase both the
risk of systemic failure and the risk of infection.  Perverse and politically motivated
structural controls may undermine  the effectiveness  of other types of financial  regulation.
Vittas emphasizes  the importance  of creating a sound and robust financial  constitution
that encourages  financial  institutions  to build adequate capital reserves, diversify their risks
and exploit potential economies  of scale and scope.  Such a constitution  should be
complemented  with a system of effective  supervision, short-term financial  accommodation,
long-term financial  restructuring  and financial  compensation  for customers  of failed
institutions. Deposit insurance, which is a special case of financial  compensation,  has a role
to piay in protecting the interests of small depositors, but if it is used to prevent runs on
fragmented  and fragile institutions, it is likely to distort incetitives  and suffer from problems
6of moral hazard.  A sound financial  constitution, which  avoids the fragisientatioi  and
segmentation  of the financial  system and discourages  the continuing  existence  of fragile and
under-capitalized  institutions, would contribute  to higher efficienicy  and stability  and would
avoid the costs ot later interventions.
For most of the post World War II period, financial  regulation in developing
countries emphasized  macroeconomic,  allocative  and structural objectives, while prudendal,
organizadonal  and protective controls were conspicuous  by their absence.  A similar patterm
was observed ii. most developed  countries, although some emphasis  was placed on prude-ntial
considerations  in a few countries.  Among developed  countries, the United States stands out
for its limited use of macroeconomic  and allocative  controls but extensi'-, reliance on
structural controls.  Vittas rnaintains  tnat many of the problems facing the U.S. financial
system, such as the fragmented  and fragile banking system, the financial  crisis of the thrift
industry, and the segmentation  of the financial  system, can be attributed to the adverse
effects of structural regulations.
The fragmentation  of the banking and thrift industries  reflects a strong tradition of
localism  in American banking and an emphasis  on populist policies motivated  by fear of the
concentration  of power that large banks from out-of-state  centers might acquire 2. Vittas
argues that economists  have undermined  potential  support for consolidation  of the banking
and thrift industries  by downplaying  the potential  economies  of scale and scope of large
banks.  By focussing  on the production side of banking services and neglecting  potential
economies  in risk and marketing, they have largely failed tu establish a strong case for
greater consolidation 3.
Regulatory  reform in both developed  and developing  countries has been motivated  by
macroeconomic  pressures  and by rapid technological  advances.  Reform has been easier to
implement  where it could be accomplished  without the need for cumbersome  legislative
2  Thi.  X  iew is echoed by White (see Chapter 9) and Polizatto (Chapter 10).
3  Tn recent years, academic  and bank economists  have started to underscore  the regulation-
induced fragmentation  and fragility of the UQ banking system (see, for instance, Berlin et al
1991, Berger and Humphrey 1990, Shaffer 1989  and Udell 1990). But these views have yet to
generate wide political support for an extensive consolidation  of the industry.  If anything,
opposition  to banking  consolidation  is still quite strong, not only among  political  circles, but also
among bank and academic economists.
7changes.  In fact, the threat of regulation, when prompt action is feasible, may have beeL.  as
effects e as actual regulation  in discouraging  excesses  and preventing abuses.  Vittas
concludes by emphasizing  that political leade ship has an important  role to play in promoting
higher stability, efficiency  and fairness in the financial  system by removing distortionary,
inefficient  and ineffective  regulations  and replacing  them with regulations that are as far as
possible neutral between different financial  intermediaries  and markets.
Issues in Financial Liberalization
Financial Liberalization  in Japan
Japian  represents an interesting example  of a country with initially extensive financial
regulations  (e.-  .ering credit ceilings, interest rate controls, directed credit programs,
geographic  and sectoral segmentation,  and branching restrictions) that was able to achieve a
high rate of growth and then proceeded to deregulate its financiai  system in a gradual and
controlled fashion.  Akiyoshi Horluchi analyzes the process of financial  liberalization  in
Japan since the end of World War II.  He first examines the relationship  between financial
regulation and economic  growth during the high growth era, specifically  the period from
1960 to the early 1970s. He then considers the financial  liberalization  that started in the
mid-'970s.  Horiuchi emphasizes that financial  liberalization  was induced by the structural
changes caused by the achievement  of high growth and that it was not a cause but rather a
consequence  of economic  development  in Japan.
Horiuchi notes that the Japanese financial  system was under comprehensive  regulation
during the high growth era, but argues that some regulations  were circumvented, for instance
loan rates were effectively  raised through the ase of compensating  balances.  He also argues
that the level of interest rates was not low in either nominal or real terms 4. However, an
important  feature of the regulatory regime was the support of high profits for banks and
other financial  institutions  and the general discrimination  against consumer credit and housing
finance.
4  This argument is based on the use of producer price inflation  for cal ulating the real rate
of interest. If the consumer  price index is used instead, then the real rate of interest was rather
low in Japan as Horiuchi acknowledges.
8The success of the Japanese authorities in containing inflation  and maintaining
macroeconomic  stability  is credited as the main reason why financial  repression did not
prevent the achievement  of economic  growth.  Horiuchi attributes this to the constraint
imposed by the balance of payments and the decision of the Japanese authorities to
discourage foreign capital inflows to relieve this constrint.  Controls on capital inflows were
also motivated  by the desire to "protect" domestic industries  from falling under foreign
ownership. He lists electrical appliances, radio sets, TV sets, plate glass, cameras, synthetic
fibers, laundries, and shipbuilding  as benefitting from such protection.  He maintains  that the
controls on foreign  capital inflows re,:nforced  the d, .ninant  role played by Japanese banks in
corporate finance.
The role of banks was also shaped by the weakness  and underdevelopment  of the
securities markets. There was no money or bond market so that nonfinancial  corporations
and households  could not place their financial  savings in uncontrolled  instruments. The
corporate bond market was prevented from playing a more active part by the Kisaikai, an
association  of trust banks and securities  companies that imposed unfavorable  conditions on
the issue of corporate bonds.  Finally, the equity market suffered from structural weaknesses,
such as the issue of new shares at par and the sharp decline of equity prices in the mid-1960s
that caused financial  distress among securities firms and scared investors away from the
se'urities markets.
Horiuchi argues that in this context the banks became the main agents of financial
intermediation. Their ability to allocate resources efficiently  was facilitated  by the
development  of close relationships  with major borrowers.  In fact, it could be argued that the
close links between banks and industry proved more effective  in overcoming  problems  of
asymmetric  information  and free riding than has been the case in countries with active and
well developed  securities markets.
Horiuchi concludes  his analysis of financial  regulation  during the high growth era by
emphasizing  that the role of govemment  financial  institutions  in stimulating  economic  growth
is exaggerated  by many commentators'. In his view (as in the opinion  of several other
leading Japanese economists,  such as Aoki, Komiya  and Teranishi), government  institutions
I  A detailed discussion  of different views on the effectiveness  of credit policies in iapan
and on the role of government financial  institutions  is contained  in Vittas and Wang (1991).
9mainly provided financial  support to declining industries, such as coal mining and shipping.
The rapidly growing dynamic sectors were mainly financed by prIvate financial  institutions,-
although  government financial  institutions  may have played an important  role by conveying
valuable signals about the government's industrial policy to the private sector.
The structural changes that occurred after the oil crisis in 1973 included a big
increase in government  borrowing, a sharp decline in the demand for funds for industrial
investmelt and a growing intemationalization  of the Japanese economy.  A landmark in the
process of liberalization,  especially as it affected wholesale  and corporate financial services,
was the relaxation of foreign exchange  controls in 1980. The rapidly growing govern,nent
debt forced the authorities to encourage the development  of a modern  and efficient bond
market.  This provided alternative  instruments  for the financial  savings  of both nonfinancial
corporations  and households. Interest rate controls on large deposits  and restrictions on new
deposit instruments  were then relaxed.  The large corporations  were able to raise funds on
the domestic and international  capital markets and stimulated the deregulation  and
moderniation of the corporate bond and equity markets. Japanese banks expanded their
operations in overseas markets and this leW  to growing international  pressures for opening the
domestic markets to foreign entry and competition.
Horiuchi identifies  three issues as meriting close policy consideration: the need to
modify the safety net in the financial  system to protect small investors  and prevent bank
panics; the need to create a robust system of regulation  and supervision  of the securities
markets, including regulations  on insider trading and promotion  of credit rating agencies; and
the need to increase the effectiveness  of anti-trust legislation. He concludes  his paper by
reiterating  that high growth in Japan was achieved without  a flexible  market-oriented
financial  system, but the structural changes of the post-high-growth  era stimulated  the gradual
liberalization  that has been tinder way since the early 1970s.
Financial  Liberalization  in Indonesia
In contrast to Japan, which maintained  a closed capital account throughout  its high
growth era and proceeded to liberalize  its controls on capital flows on a very gradual and
cautious basis, Indonesia provides an example of substantial  deregulation  and financial  sector
development  in the context of a very open foreign exchange market.  David Cole and Betty
Slade review the Indonesian  experience  between the mid-1960s  and the late 1980s. They
10stress that contrary to the conventional  wisdom that the capital account should be opened
only after domestic investment, trade and financial  reforms are first implemented,  Indonesia
removed  all foreign capital controls when its foreign  exchange position was still precarious
and the economy  was subject to a wide array of controls.  Cole and Slade argue that the
main reason for taling this action at that time was that the government  could not exert
effective  control over foreign capital movements.
The removal of foreign exchange  controls was preceded by drastic macroeconomic
adjustment  to eliminate fiscal deficits, restrict domestic credit expansion  and counteract the
hyperinflation  and negative growth of the early to mid-1960s. However, the authorities
imposed various financial  controls after 1973 but without  reversing the decision to keep an
open capital account.  The combination  of credit ceilings on domestic banks with an open
capital account caused a shift of much financial  activity offshore.  Domestic financial  sector
development  stagnated  and most industrial investment  was financed  in overseas markets.
Since 1983, the Indonesian  authorities have pursued a policy of financial  reform to
stimulate  the growth of the domestic financial  system, still within the context of an open
foreign exchange system. The program of reform involved  the removal  of credit ceilings  and
interest rate controls and was preceded by a major devaluation  and fiscal retrenchment. The
reform resulted in rapid growth of the banking system but exposed the economy  to sudden
shocks  emanating from large falls of foreign exchange  reserves and bouts of speculation
about imminent  devaluation. These were reinforced  by a further major devaluation  in 1986.
However, the authorities  took measures  to stimulate  the development  of an active domestic
money market to allow a more flexible response  to changes in the financial  position of the
country.  More recently the Indonesian  authorities have taken steps to stimulate  the growth of
the capital markets and to open the financial  system to greater competition  from both
domestic and foreign participants.
Cole and Slade note that the periods of high domestic financial  growth were not
correlated with the periods of high real growth.  The initial period of financial  growth
between 1968 and 1972 occurred at a time when the economy was growing quite rapidly, but
mainly due to recovery from a long period of mismanagement  and deterioration. Then
during the decade of high economic  growth and high investment  deriving from the oil boom,
the domestic financial  system languished. Finally, after the decline in oil prices, and real
growth became more erratic, domestic  financial  development  accelerated. Domestic financial
11growth was influenced  more by financial  policy measures  than by the overall growth of the
economy.
A key question addressed by Cole and Slade is whether the Indonesian  experience
represents a special case of a country that had to follow a less than optimal sequence  of
reforms by force of circumstances  and managed  to succeed largely due to good luck or
whether it represents a reasonable, or even better, sequence  of financial  reform.  In their
view, the open capital account has imposed a healthy degree of restraint on both fiscal and
monetary policy.  They note that an open capital account both incites and requires good
macroeconomic  management. For countries which are capable of pursuing reasonably sound
macro policies, the Indonesian approach may be worthy of consideration.
Financial  Liberalization  in Chile
The third paper on issues in financial  liberalization  focusses on the Chilean experience
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Hernan  Cortes-Douglas  highlights  the links between financial
and other reforms in Chile, following  the military coup in 1973 that overthrew the Allende
government. Cortes-Douglas  emphasizes  the success of the reforms in the long-run and the
extensive transformation  of the Chilean economy  and financial  system over the past twenty
years or so.  He also stresses, however, the mistakes  of the authorities  in pursuing financial
reform in the 1970s  and underscores the conflict between opposing groups of policy makers
on the importance  of prudential regulation.
At the time of the 1973 coup, the Chilean economy  was characterized by an oversized
public sector, a very high rate,  of monetary expansion  and inflation, extensive price and
exchange controls, and excessive protectionism  and regulation  of industry, commerce,
transportation  and finance.  The Pinochet regime proceeded  to reduce public sector deficits
and implement  far-reaching  reforms in trade, public enterprises and finance.  The re-
privatization  of firms taken under public ownership by the Allende administration  was a key
element of early reforms.  The prevailing philosophy  was one of free markets with a minimal
amount of regulation.
Credit ceilings, directed credit programs and interest rate controls were eliminated.
Limits on foreign capital imports and foreign borrowing were also removed  and access to
such borrowing was encouraged by repeated pronouncements  of the commitment  to a fixed
12nominal  exchange rate.  To facilitate  the privatization  process, the authorities encouraged
access to bank credit by the new owners and allowed the formation  of large conglomerates  or
grupos with interests in bankdng,  insurance, industry and commerce. The groups bought
banks on credit and used bank loans to buy privatized firms and to finance important
investment  projects and restructuring  expenditures  as well as real estate development  projects
and shopping malls in later years.  The result was the creation of an excessively  indebted
private sector dominated  by a few large conglomerates.
Cortes-Douglas  underscores the differences  of opinion among three opposing  views
within government  ranks on the issue of financial  reform.  The predominant  view was the
"free banking" approach that downplayed  the importance  of prudential regulation  and was
against any involvement  by the government in preventing  bank failures. A second view
emphasized  the importance  of prudential  regulation  and argued that the government should
guarantee  bank liabilities  and regulate banks and other financial  institutions  to reduce the risk
of failures.  The third view was in favor of continued financial  repression  on the grounds that
depositors  should be protected  but banks were difficult to control in a non-repressed
environment.
Cortes-Douglas  discusses  three episodes of financial  failure in the 1970s that
exemplified  the confusion and inconsistency  of policies of financial  reform.  The first was the
failure in 1975 of the Chilean savings  and loan institutions. Following  the free banking  and
minimalist  approach, the government refused to cover their deposit liabilities, but forced
their conversion into long-term  bonds at less than par value.  The second episode occurred in
1976 when in order to prevent a flight to quality by depositors, the government  guaranteed
the deposits  of the Banco Osorno group.  This represented  a first but partial victory by
advocates  of prudential  regulation.  The third episode was that of Banco Espanol in 1980
when following  the introduction  of a loan classification  system, auditors announced  that on
37% of loans the bank lacked information  to assess the borrowers' ability to repay their
loans.  Although  Banco Espanol was originally rescued by a takeover from another large
bank, it was one of four banks and four finance companies  that were intervened  in November
1981.
The financial  crisis of 1982 was precipitated  by a regulation  that sought to drastically
linit  lending by group-owned  banks to companies  affiliated to the same group.  The
conglomerates  were given no time to comply with the new rules, but were able to evade
13them by creating many shell affiliates, swapping  loans with other grupos and using mutual
funds to replace bank loans.  The crisis was triggered, however, by the rise in international
real interest rates and the massive  withdrawal  of foreign funds following  the devaluation  of
June 1982. When the crisis erupted, the authorities were forced to intervene  and take over
60 per cent of the banking sector.  They were also forced to change radically their approach
and to make strong and effective  prudential regulation the cornerstone  of bank and financial
regulation.
Since the 1982 crisis, the financial  system has undergone major transformation  and
expansion. The banks have been successfully  reprivatized  and the insurance sector has been
deregulated  with a strong emphasis  on solvency monitoring. The reform and replacement  of
the public pension system by a government mandated  but privately operated system of
individual  capitalization  accounts has contributed  to the generation  of large long-term savings
and has stimulated  the growth of the capital markets. Draconian rules have been imposed on
the private pension funds to ensure their safety and protect the interests of their members.
The Chilean  authorities appear to have learned well the lesson that economic  and financial
liberalization  must be accompanied  by the creation of a strong and effective  infrastructure  of
prudential regulation and supervision.
Banking  Crises and Restructuring
The Chilean experience shows that economic  and financial  liberalization  without a
proper framework of prudential regulation may lead to abuses of market power, conflicts  of
interest, and unsustainable  and imprudent  expansion. Such a process is bound to end in a
major fitwncial  crisis that requires the intervention  of the authorities to avert the complete
collapse  of the financial  system.  However, banking  crises may also occur in countries that
do not undergo major liberalization  of their financial  systems.  The proximate  causes of
banking crisis may then be either a segment of the banking system that is not properly
supervised  and may engage in imprudent  or fraudulent  behavior or a segment that is subject
to inconsistent  regulations  and to incentives  that are incompatible  with stable and sustained
expansior.. Another aspe-wt  of banking crises is the speed of reaction by the authorities to
restructure  ailing institutions,  contain losses and remove the causes that brought about the
crisis in the first place.  Effective  and speedy resolution mechanisms  are essential for limiting
losses and for avoiding the prolongation  of the adverse effects of banldng crises on the real
economy.
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Andrew  Sheng discusses  the experience of Malaysia with banking crisis and
restructuring  in the mid-1980s. The Malaysian  case is a prime example of decisive and
effective  action.  In 1985  and 1986, the economy suffered from deflation  as falling prices
caused nominal  GNP to decline more rapidly than real GNP.  The financial  system also
suffered from steep falls in commodity,  securities and property prices that had reached
unsustairable  levels following  a long period of expansion  and speculative  investments  in
property and equities. With property loans accounting  for 36% of all bank loans in 1986, up
from 26% in 1980, commercial  banks incurred heavy losses.  In addition, finance companies
and deposit takdng  cooperatives  (DTCs) were heavily exposed  to property investments.
Faced with a potentially  major financial  crisis and loss of confidence  in the stability  of
the financial system, the authorities  took decisive action to stem the losses, recapitalize
distressed banks and intervene  in institutions  that were unable to inject new capital.  Because
the Malaysian monetary  authorities had in place an effective  system of banking supervision
with stiff requirements  for provisions  against bad and doubtful debts and suspension  of
interest accrual, the impact  of the recession  and of the fall in commodity,  securities and
property prices on the big banks, though large in terms of reported losses, was contained  by
injections  of fresh capital.  Worst hit by the recession  were four medium-size  commercial
banks that incurred heavy losses, particularly from their involvement  in the property sector.
The central bank intervened, replaced the management  and board of directors of these banks
and made arrangements for fresh injection  of capital, including  direct capital from the central
bank itself.  The central bank also had to assume control of four finance companies, which
were unable to inject new capital to cover their losses.
The impact of the recessicn was much greater on DTCs, a group of institutions  that
accepted deposits from the public but were not supervised  by the central bank and did not
have access to its lender of last resort facilities. The first step here was to undertake a
detailed investigation  of affected institutions  to establish the extent of losses.  As Sheng
notes, 17 accounting  firms were employed to undertake, in conjunction  with examiners from
the central bank, detailed audits of 24 affected institutions. To assess public opinion on an
appropriate rescue scheme, the government  appointed a committee to find a restructuring
plan that would be acceptable  to all.  The Committee  recommended  that DTCs with small
15losses should be merged or taken over by financially  strorg banks and finance companies.
For DTCs with large losses, the committee recommended  that depositors should be offered a
combination  of cash and equity or convertible  bonds.  All DTCs were placed under central
bank supervision, while to forestall law suits from jeopardizing the whole rescue package,
receivers from accounting firms were appointed by the High Court to manage their assets.
Despite the long history of effective  bank supervision, the authorities  introduced key
changes in banking laws and regulations to emphasize  prudential  safeguards, such as
minimum  capital requirements, dispersion  of ownership,  controls on connected lending,
limits on risk concentrations,  guidelines  on provisions for loan losses and suspension  of
interest accrual on nonperforming  loans, and improved  statistical  reporting to the central
bank.  In addition, thie  central bank was granted clearer intervention  powers, including the
right to enter and search offices, detain persons, impound passports, freeze property, issue
cease and desist orders, and assume control of operations.
The Malaysian authorities  were able to contain the banking crisis by taking prompt
action to assess the extent of losses and address the problems  of capital adequacy  and
competent management.  With economic  recovery resuming in 1987, the central bank was
able to stabilize public confidence  in the financial  system and avoid the dangers of contagion
spreading.
Banking  Crisis in Norway
In contrast to Malaysia, the Norwegian  experience with financial  liberalization  and
banking crisis has been one of prolonged distress and repeated interventions  that culminated
in the effective "nationalization'  of virtually the whole banling system in 1991. To be fair,
the Norwegian  authorities  did not lack in decisive action.  As noted by Jon  A. Sokheim,  they
intervened to replace the management  and board of directors of the DnC Bank in the spring
of 1988, following  heavy losses suffered  after the collapse  of securities markets in October
1987. They also arranged for mergers of institutions  in distress, for capital injections and
for extension of appropriate guarantees  by the country's two bank guarantee funds, not to
mention  the provision of liquidity by the central bank.  However, where the authorities
proved lacking was perhaps in undertaking  a thorough  assessment  of both the extent of losses
suffered by banks and their exposure to firms in financial  difficulty.
16The problems faced by Norwegian  banks have their ruuts in the extensive
deregulation  of Norwegian  banking in the mid-1980s  after a long period of tight restrictions,
in the failure to introduce adequate prudendal regulations, and in the unfortunate  timing of
deregulation  with a period of strong, but unsustainable,  expansion  that was stimulated  by
large oil revenues.  Macropolicy  failures, such as the reluctance to raise the level of nominal
interest rates and the delayed reducticFn  of the tax deductibility  of loan interest payments,
resulted in a negative real after-tax cost of borrowing that stimulated the demand for bank
loans and induced banks to compete for market share and disregard the soundness  and long-
term profitability of their lending.
When oil prices fell in 1986, the Norwegian  economy suffered a major economic
recession  from which it has still to emerge.  The banks incurred loan losses amounting  to
between 1.5-2.5% of loans each year.  As a result, their capital has been seriously eroded
and in some cases completely  wiped out.  Assistance  was initially provided by the two
guarantee funds operated by the commercial  and savings banks respectively, but after the
exhaustion of these funds, the government  was forced to establish  a government  bank
insurance fund to support the operations of ailing banks.  The authorities  are also
encouraging  an extensive  process of consolidation  and retrenchment  and have created a new
institution  that will participate in new equity issues from private banks and help return sound
banks to private ownership.
The Thrift Debacle  in the United States
While the Malaysian  and Norwegian  cases differ in the degree of success of
government intervention,  they both represent  cases where banking  problems were
immediately  recognized and prompt action was taken to tackle them.  There are, however,
many countries where govemments  have refused to recognize  the existence  of nonperforming
loans and the mounting  'osses of banks.  Among  developed  countries, a prime example of
such attitude is the United States where the authorities  have been very slow to appreciate  the
deteriorating  financial  condition  of the savings and loan industry.  As noted by Lawrence
White, faced with large losses deriving from a negative interest margin in the early '980s,
savings and loan associations  were authorized to diversify into other risky activities in the
hope that profits from new activides could help rebuild their eroded capital.
17White discusses the debacle of the US thrift industry in the context of its regulation
and especially the accounting rules that applied on the measurement  of its equity.  He
emphasizes  the point that institutions with high leverage are inclined to engage in risky
activities. This inclinatioa is strengthened  if depositors  are protected by cr._ible deposit
insurance while prudential regulation and supervision  is weak and ineffective.  White stresses
that since net worth and solvency are important  concepts  ror prudential regulation,
accounting rules should be designed to yield market values for assets, liabilities, and off-
balance-sheet  items.  He notes that the accepted  accounting framework  is based on historic
costs rather than current values,  while special accounting  rules were introduced for the
thrifts that allowed them to overstate their net worth 6.
The wider investment  powers conferred on thrifts in combination with increased limits
for deposit insurance, the use of brokered deposits, the overstatement  of net worth and
weakened thrift supervision  encouraged many thrifts to undertake massive growth drives that
in some cases resulted in a doubling or even quadrupling  of their size within the spate of
three years.  Many of the rapidly growing thrifts were controlled  by new entrepreneurs, who
were either inexperienced  and overly aggressive  or engaged in outright fraud.  This
unsustainable  expansion  was then made worse by the fall in oil prices, that affected in
particular thrifts in oil producing states such as Texas, Oklahoma and Colorado, and radical
changes in tax laws that first made commercial  real estate a tax-favored  investment  and then
reversed course and subjected real estate to less favorable tax treatment.
Faced with massive  and growing losses from thrift insolvencies,  the authorities were
forced to seek additional funding for the disposal  of insolvent  thrifts and to transfer
responsibility  for regulating, supervising  and disposing  thrifts to three new federal agencies
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  that had previously  provided deposit
insurance for commercial  banks.  The U.S. experience  shows that failure to perceive the
extent of the thrift problem and a perverse regulatory reaction in the early 1980s caused what
6  White  places strong  emphtasis  on the use of market-value  accounting. This is a view that
is espoused by a growing number of economists  but has yet to receive official backing. There
are two problems with market-value  accounting. First, it is difficult to assign market values to
a wide range of assets and liabilities  of financial  institutions.  Second, market values fluctuate
widely  and are depressed when capital  is needed  most. To be effective,  market-value  accounting
must be accompanied  by minimum capital ratios that vary procyclically with market values.
Perhaps, market value accounting would  not be necessary  if financial  institutions  are allowed to
diversify their risks and are not allowed to take excessive  risks, especially interest rate risks.
18could have been a manageable  loss to magnify into a major debacle that is likely to exceed
$150 billion on a discounted present value basis.
Regulatory Framework  for Banks and Other Financial Institutions
The experience of Chile, Malaysia, Norway and the United States, reviewed  in this
volume, underscores the importance  of an effective  framework of prudential regulation  and
banking supervision. This is a theme that has received growing acceptance  among policy
makers in both developed  and developing  countries over the past decade or so.  However,
accepting  a principle is not easily translated  to successful  action without a clear
understanding  of the necessary preconditions  for such a framework  and the essential  changes
in laws, regulations  and procedures.
Prudentiat  Regulation and Supervision  of Banks
Vincent Polizatto  discusses  these issues and reviews  both alternative  approaches  used
in different developed  countries and the growing convergence  towards a common system of
prudential regulation and supervision. Polizatto states that prudential regulation  is the
codification  of public policy for sound and stable banking systems, while banking supervision
is the means of ensuring the banks' compliance  with public policy.  He emphasizes  the
importance  of political independence  of bank supervisors and the need for support from
government  officials at the highest levels.
The prudential  nrles that should  apply to banks include clear rules on criteria for
entry, capital adequacy standards, asset diversification,  limits on loans to insiders,
permissible range of activities, asset classification  and provisioning, external audits,
enforcement  powers and failure resolution mechanisms. Criteria for entry should cover the
minimum  capital requirement, the qualifications  of management,  the development  of
reasonable  business plans and projections, and the financial  strength of the proposed owners.
Capital adequacy standards should ideally include risk-based  capital ratios that take account
of the riskiness of different assets, both on and off the balance sheet.  The guidelines
formulated  by the Basle Committee  of Bank Supervisors  are increasingly  adopted by
developing  countries.  Capital adequacy standards  should also include a clear definition  of
different components  of capital and should impose  limits on the distribution  of dividends  if
minimum  standards are not met.
19Banks achieve a better combination  of risk and return by diversifying  their operations.
Thus, blanket restrictions on geographic  expansior.  and product diversification  should not be
condoned by prudential regulations.  But lending, investment  and other exposure limits,
which prevent the concentration  of risk in a single borrower or a related group of borrowers,
are necessary for prudential purposes.  These limits should be expressed as a percentage of a
bank's capital.  A frequent cause of loan problems is credit granted to insiders and connected
parties,  Therefore, limits on loans to insiders, including  large shareholders, and related
companies, should be established. These should not only limit the amount of credit
extended, but should also require that such credit should not benefit from more favorable
terms and conditions than credit to ordinary customers.  Prudential  regulations should also
stipulate whether banks can engage in commercial, industrial and nonbanking  financial
activities and whether they can own equity stakes in nonbanking  firms.  To discourage  banks
from assuming  excessive risks, clear limits should be set on such activities, if they are
permitted at all.
Polizatto argues that one of the most serious deficiencies  of prudential regulation  in
developing  counuries  is the failure to recognize  problem assets through classification,
provisioning, write off, and interest suspension. Prudential regulations  should require banks
to classify  assets according to specific  criteria, define nonperforming  assets, suspend interest
accrual on nonperforming  assets (and reverse previously  accrued but uncollected  interest),
preclude the refinancing or capitalizaton of interest, and mandate minimum  provisions to the
reserves for possible losses based on the classification  of assets.  External audits serve as a
means to independently  verify and disclose the financial  position of banks.  However,
external audits must follow clear rules and procedures  established  by bank regulators  and
should include an examination  of asset portfolio quality, standards  for valuing assets,
adequacy of loan loss reserves, and treatment of interest on nonperforming  assets.
Regulators should also have the power to appoint or dismiss auditors and should be informed
of any significant  findings  in a timely manner.
A crucial aspect of prudential regulation regards the enforcement  powers given to
bank supervisors to intervene  to prevent losses from magnifying  and to effect timely
resolutions of bank failures.  Polizatto stresses the importance  of conferring to bank
supervisors the right to issue "cease and desist" orders, impose fines, appoint receivers,
merge or liquidate  b.anks,  and generally  play an active direct or indirect part in the
management  of ailing institutions.
20Polizatto also reviews  alternative models of bank supervision. He compares the
infor.nal system based on consultation,  personal contact, discretion and moral suasion that
traditionally  prevailed  in Britain in the past with the strongly  populist and confrontational
approach based on detailed "rules of the game" and intensive  on-site examinations  that
prevailed in the United States.  A third system, reflecting  the experience of continental
Europe, was based on a legalistic approach that stipulated  various ratios but relied on
extemal auditors for verifying  compliance  with the rules.  Polizatto  stresses the convergence
in systems of prudential  regulation (e.g. the adoption  of the risk-weighted  capital ratios based
on the guidelines  formulated  by the Basle Committee)  and in systems of bank supervision.
Most countries now emphasize  the complementary  roles of off-site surveillance  and on-site
inspection. The former relies on the submission  of regular reports, assessment  of financial
position and performance  and pee: reviews, while the latter involves detailed periodic
examinations  of bank records and policy statements.
Polizatto highlights  the importance  of recruiting  able staff and training them to
become specialized  examiners as well as retaining experienced  officers through appropriate
compensation  packages.  He concludes his paper by stressing that the first line of defense
against bank insolvencies  and financial  system distress is the qualitv and character of
management  within the banks themselves. Therefort., efforts to strengthen the financial
system must also focus on building strong management.
The Role of DePosit Insurance
Deposit insurance  represents one of the most controversial  elements of the prudential
regulatory framework  of bardks. The greatest concern focusses  on the risk of moral hazard
that is inherent in almost any scheme of deposit insurance. There is much debate about the
faults in the design of deposit insurance in the United States and its contribution  to the
debacle of the thrift industry and the current weakness  of commercial  banks.  Many
proposals have been made about the use of risk-based  premiums, the effectiveness  of
supervision  and the streamlining  of failure resolution mechanisms,  although  the predominant
experience is one of excessive  encouragement  of risk taking  and excessive  cost to taxpayers.
Deposit insurance may have four objectives: to protect small depositors; to avert
generalized bank runs; to promote competition;  and to act as a catalyst for strengthening
bank supervision. The first objective  is valid and widely accepted  and is in fact applied to
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funds) and not just deposit institutions. The other three objectives  are open to question.  As
discussed  by Vittas 7, structural controls that do not inhibit consolidation  and do not
encourage  the emergence of fragmented and fragile banking systems may be more effective
than the offer of deposit insurance both in averting bank panics and in promoting effective
competition.
Samuel Talley and Ignacio Mas do net challenge the conventional  wisdom on the
objectives  of deposit insurance.  They argue, however, that the debate about the rationale  for
explicit deposit insurance misses the point that in most countries the real choice facing policy
makers is not between explicit schemes  and no protection  but between explicit and implicit
deposit  protection schemes. Experience from most countries shows that except for very
small banks, governments  generally  intervene to protect depositors  in failed banks and
prevent bank panics that might involve a flight to cash and real assets or a capital flight
overseas.
Talley and Mas specify the features of two extreme types of deposit protection: an
implicit protection  system where there are no detailed rules and procedures, protection  is
completely  discretionary, the amount of protection  may vary from zero to total protection,
there is no ex ante funding, and ex post funding is provided by the government;  and an
explicit insurance scheme where there are detailed rules and procedures, there is a legal
obligation  for protection (with some discretionary  element for noninsured  depositors), the
amount of protection may vary from limited to total protection, there is ex ante funding
through premiums, and failures are covered by the fund, although  additional assessments  may
be levied on banks or government  contributions  may be made.
Talley and Mas stress that explicit schemes have both advantages  and disadvantages
over implicit  ones.  They con3titute  a better administrative  process for resolving  bank failures
and are more effective in protecting  small depositors. On the other hand, they are less
flexible  than implicit schemes, which enjoy greater degrees of freedom in terms of the
amount, form and timing of the protection  offered.  Talley and Mas note that both types of
schemes  are exposed to moral hazard, but they stress that explicit schemes presuppose  stable
banking systems, effective  prudential regulation  and banking supervision,  and adequate
7  See Chapter 3.
22funding sources. The treatment of banks varies between the two schemes. If the
government  (or the central bank) assumes the costs of bank failures under an implicit system,
then the banking system derives a large subsidy.  In practice, however, banks are made to
pay either through increased taxes (e.g. increased reserve requirements)  or through induced
participation  in takeovers of failed banks, where the costs are shared between the bank
involved  and the authorities.
Talley and Mas also examine a number of important features of explicit deposit
insurance  systems.  These include the choice between public and private as well as between
compulsory  and voluntary systems, the amount of protection (which may vary from limited,
total and discretionary),  the role of prefunding, the base of premium assessment  and use of
fixed or risk-based  premiums, and the design of failure resolution mechanisms. In general,
Talley and Mas favor compulsory, public systems, with limited but discretionary  protection,
adequate prefunding, risk-based  premiums and effective resolution mechanisms. However,
they stress that the design of national deposit insurance schemes must be effected on a case-
by-case basis to take account  of local circumstances.
The Regulation  of Life Insurance  Companies
The financial  systems of most developing  countries continue to be dominated  by
commercial  banks.  With few exceptions, insurance companies  and pension  funds account for
small and insignificant  shares of total financial  assets.  The main reasons for the
underdevelopment  of contractual  savings institutions  are the low level of income, the
existence  of pay-as-you-go  public pension systems, the imposition  of repressive regulations
and the use of insurance and pension reserves for financing  the public sector deficit at below
market rates.
Contractual  savings institutions  are more developed  in those countries  that impose
mandatory  funded schemes for pensions such as Singapore, Malaysia and Chile.  In fact, the
organization  of a country's pension system is nowadays  a major determinant  of financial
structure, not only in developing  countries but also in developed  ones 8. However, the
regulation  of insurance business, and especially life insurance, is also an important factor.
8  For a brief discussion of these points, see Vittas (1992).
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has emphasized  the fixing of piemiums at levels that are adequate to pay future claims and
avoid insolvencies. The other approach is based on solvency moritoring.  It avoids tariff
setting but requires the mvintenance  of adequate =hnical  reserves and capital resources for
ensuring the solvency  of insurance  companies. The two approaches  are not mutually
exclusive. For instance, solvency margins are emphasized  in countries where premiums are
fixed centrally, while solvency  monitoring  has implications  for premiuin setting by insurance
companies. It is generally  agreed that the first system of regulation  achieves greater
stability, but at the cost of higher prices and limited innovation. However, both systems face
difficult issues in regulating  distribution networks  and selling techniques.
Thomas Rabe discusses the regulation of life insurance companies  in the United
Kingdom  and Germany.  He notes that in Germany policy conditions  are subject to approval
by supervisory  authorities  in order to prevent the offer of 'deceptive" packages. The
supervisory  authority also approves the basic elements of premium calculation, such as
mortality  tables, discount rate and loadings. The result of this approach is to discourage
innovation  (unit-linked  life policies  account for a very small share of total business in
Germany) and to encourage  high initial premiums that are then partly rebated to
policyholders. In contrast, UK life insurance companies  enjoy considerable  freedom in both
product innovation  and premium setting.  It is generally  claimed that life policies are cheaper
in the United Kingdom,  especially for shorter terms.
Rabe notes that there are also substantial  differences  in the regulation  of investments.
In Germany, regulations  limit the freedom of investment  by specifying  the range of permitted
assets.  Although the German authorities  avoid the use of investment regulations  for directing
insurance funds into low-yielding  securities, the imposed limits discourage investments  in
corporate equities and overseas assets.  In the United Kingdom, insurance  companies  are not
subject to any regulations  on their investments,  except that valuation  rules specify upper
limits on assets that are admissible  in calculating technical  reserves and solvency margins.
There is a substantial  difference in the valuation  of assets.  In Germany, companies
must use, in most cases, the lower of cost or current value.  Unrealized  investment  gains
may not be taken into the profit and loss account and cannot be distributed. Thus, like
banks, German insurance companies  have considerable  hidden  reserves.  In the United
Kingdom,  companies  are free to use market value, historic cost or a value between the two.
24However, in statutory  returns, assets must be shown at market vaiues.  Unrealized  gains are
commonly  taken into the profit and loss, although  it is the responsibility  of the appointed
actuary to determine which portion of unrealized  gains can be distributed.
With regard to distribution networks, Rabe notes that there is no regulation  on the
seliing  and marketing  of life insurance in Germany.  As a result, most selling is effected
through tied agents and companies  tend to mount lavish and aggressive  campaigns  that raise
commissions  and other selling  costs.  In the United Kingdom, there is regulatory distinction
between tied agents and independent  brokers (polarization). Tied agents sell products of one
life office.  In contrast, independent  brokers are required to offer best advice.  Because of
the stringent standards, 50% of independent  brokers have decided to become tied agents.
The sale of life insurance products is still a controversial  issue in the United Kingdom,  as in
most other countries.  Insurance  companies  emphasize  that insurance  business is not bought
and has to be sold, but there is widespread  concern that customers are pushed to buy policies
they do not need.  It is estimated  that 40% of long-term  life policies  are allowed to lapse
after two years, at great expense to policyholders. Rabe concludes the comparison  of
regulatory  regimes between the two countries by noting that in Germany  there are no
compensation  or guarantee funds on the grounds that the state ensures that no insurance
insolvency will ever be allowed to take place.  In the United Kingdom, where regulation  is
less pervasive, compensation  funds cover up to 90% of insured amounts in cases of
insolvency.
Rabe also discusses  the trend toward deregulation  that is under way in most
continental European  countries and the policy of the European Commission  to create a single
market in insurance.  The objectives  of the single market include freedom of establishment  in
any member  country, freedom of cross-border operations, use of the same key supervisory
rules regarding solvency, reserving, guarantee funds, investments  and policy design, and
similar controls over selling methods  and distribution  networks.  An important feature is the
elimination  of premium controls and their replacement  with solvency margins that take
account  of both premium levels and loss experience. In this way, deceptive  packages may be
avoided without stringent  controls on prices and product innovation.
The initiatives  taken by member states of the European Community  have had a
tremendous  impact  on insurance regulation  in many other countries.  Not only other
European countries, including  those in Eastern Europe, but also countries in Latin America,
25North Africa and Asia have reformed or are contemplating  reforms of their insurance
legislation in line with the main principles adopted at the EC level.
Regulatory Issues in Integrated Fmancial Systems
The financial  systems of many countries have been characterized by a number of
major trends that have been described by long and ugly words.  These are difficult to
pronounce, and even more so to spell, but the trends are no less real for that.  The trends
can be usefully classified into pairs:
- Liberalization  and deregulation
- Internationalization and globalization
- Securitization  and marketization
- Privatization and demutualization
- Universalization  and institutionalization
- Decompartmentalization  and integration
These trends reflect changes in both structure  and behavior and have far reaching
implications  for the stability, efficiency  and fairness  of financial  systems. They have been
accompanied  by a development that can be described  as paradoxical:  growing concentration
of markets through an extensive  consolidation  process, but also growing competition  through
the removal  of boundaries that used to separate different markets.
Unfortunately, theoretical  and empirical  economic  work has shed little light on the
benefits and costs of alternative  arrangements  of financial  system structure.  The vast
literature on economies  of scale and scope in banking has been unable to explain the
persistent increase in concentration. Universal  banking and integrated financial  systems raise
far more complex issues and it is not surprising that there is a greater difference  of opinion
among economists  on the merits and demerits of universal  banks than there is perhaps on the
existence  of economies  of scale and scope.
Universal  Banking in Canada
Universal banking has been extensively  debated in many countries in recent years, but
perhaps nowhere as thoroughly and openly as in 'Canada. Charles Freedman reviews the
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adopted in Canada.  Freedman notes that there are two principal uses of the term universal
banking: one definition  refers to the ability of banks to engage in securities  business; the
other to their ability to own and control nonfinancial  entities.  Banks in Canada are primarily
interested in underwriting corporate bonds and equities, and not in owning and controlling
industrial and commercial  companies. The narrow definition  is, therefore, more appropriate
in the Canadian  context.
Freedman also draws a clear distinction  between upstream and downstream  linkages
between banks and nonfinancial  corporations. Upstream  linkages exist when nonfinancial
companies  own and control banks, downstream  linkages when banks own and control
nonfinancial  corporations. Upstream  linkages generally give rise  to greater concern among
policy makers and regulators.
The Canadian financial  system has traditionally  been compartmentalized  by function
between chartered banks, trust and mortgage loan companies, cooperative  credit institutions,
insurance  companies  and securities dealers.  Most of the largest institutions  have been widely
held, either because it has been required by law as in the case of the big chartered banks
(known as schedule I banks) or because they have been constituted  as mutual  entities (as in
the case of credit cooperatives  and some of the largest life insurance  companies). However,
some large trust companies  have recently come under close ownership as parts of industrial
and commercial  conglomerates. Regulatory  responsibility  has been divided between the
federal and provincial  governments,  with sole federal government  responsibility  for banks,
sole provincial responsibility  for credit cooperatives  and securities dealers, and dual (federal
and provincial) responsibility  for trust and insurance companies.
The traditional separation  of functions  has been blurring over the past twenty five
years or so: banks have expanded  into consumer credit and mortgage finance; trust
companies, credit cooperatives  and securities  dealers into payment services; trust companies
into consumer credit and even commercial  lending; insurance  companies  into savings
instruments, such as single premium deferred annuities  that closely resemble fixed-term
deposits; commercial  banks into various forms of insurance;  etc.  The blurring of
demarcation  lines, the need to create a level playing field for all financial  institutions  and to
establish  a sound and robust regulatory  framework, and the competitive  impact from
developments  in overseas markets have prompted  the Canadian authorities  to consider
27legislative  changes with far-reaching  implications  for the structure  and functioning  of the
Canadian financial  system.
Freedman addresses the issues of ownership, self dealing, conflicts of interest and
corporate governance that are at the heart of the debate about integrated financial  systems.
He notes that although the ownership issue has been the most contentious  one, the authorities
have concluded that large banks and insurance  companies  should continue to be widely held
but smaller financial  institutions  could be closely-held  and commercially-linked. On self
dealing there is widespread  agreement on the need to impose strict limits on transactions  with
related parties.  Conflicts  of interest could be handled Lhrough  better information  disclosure,
establishment  of effective  monitoring  machinery  and a reliance on reputational  considerations
that would prevent banks and other financial  institutions  from abusing  privileged information.
Strengthening  of the functioning  of boards of directors and of the role of external auditors
would be two essential elements of tackling  corporate governance  issues.
Freedman then discusses  the impact  of the 1987 change in legislation  that allowed
commercial  banks and other financial  institutions  to acquire securities firms.  He considers
three rationales for the legal separation  of banking and securities business:  the assumption  of
excessive  risks by banks and its impact on deposit insurance; the potential  conflicts of
interest between bank lending and underwriting;  and the concentration  of financial  power.
He notes that banks in Canada are not permitted to engage in trust business, but otherwise
the traditional separation  between  banks and securities business was based on custom rather
than Iogislation. In contrast, in the United States, there is a legal separation  between
commercial  and investment  banking, but commercial  banks are allowed to engage in trust
business. These contradictions  reflect historical  accidents but clearly weaken the rationale
for enforced separation. In Canada, factors motivating  change included the growth of
syndicated  lending, the advent of securitization  of corporate financing  business and the need
for increased capital by securities  dealers.  Following  the change in securities legislation  in
1987, Canadian banks, both domestic and foreign (but not insurance  or trust companies)
entered the securities industry, mostly  by acquiring  existing securities firms.  There was also
an influx of several foreign dealers.
As noted in Chapter 13, Freedman's paper was completed before the latest legislative
developments. In fact, following  a long process of debate and consultation,  the Canadian
government  adopted on December 13, 1991 (date of Royal Assent)  a new regulatory
28framework  for all fimancial  institutions, consisting  of four new acts governing  banks, trust
and loan companies, financial  cooperative  associations  and insurance  companies. The new
financial  services legislation will come into force sometime  in 1992.
Recognizing  the unavoidable  integration of financial  services, the new regime enables
every institution  t.  offer a complete  range of financial  services, in many instances  through
subsidiaries. The expression "financial  services" is not defined, thus providing flexibility to
expand and adjust to a fast-changing  environment  both in Canada and abroad.  An important
feature of the new legislation  is its high degree of standardization  of rules applicable  to
different types of institutions. Thus, new banks, insurance  companies  and trust companies
will be incorporated  in the same way.  The rules governing  related-party  transactions,
directors' liability, board composition,  shareholdings,  insider trading and the role of external
auditors are common  to all and are, for the most part, identical.  With respect to permitted
in-house activities, financial  institutions  are confined  to the provision of financial  services.
Banks will be barred from insuring  risks, issuing life annuities  and acting as insurance
agents.  Insurance companies  will be able to do everything banks do except take deposits.
Insurance  companies  and banks will be unable to engage ir. trust business or in
underwriting  corporate bonds and equities.  The former activity remains the exclusive
function of trust companies,  while the latter belongs to securities  firms.  However, banks and
insurance  companies  will be able to own subsidiaries  specializing  in these and other areas,
including  each other's area of expertise. The list of permitted subsidiaries  is quite long and
effectively  open-ended. For instance, banks are allowed to own insurance, reinsurance,
trust, loan, securities, investment  (mutual) fund, venture capital, factoring, equipment leasing
and financial holding  companies  as well as any entities which primarily provide financial
services.  There is no requirement for specialized  subsidiaries  to be organized through a
holding  company structure.
Thus, the Canadian system has not only adopted the concept of universal  banking but
has also authorized the emergence of 'allfinanz" or "hancassurance",  which refers to the
marriage of banking  and insurance and is spreading  rapidly in Europe.  One limitation that
applies on banks and represents  a political concession to insurance  agents is that banks will
not be allowed to sell insurance products through their branches, nor to use their large
customer databases for insurance marketing  purposes.  However, use of credit card
29distribution networks is permitted so that this restriction may turn out to be less binding in
practice.
The Debate on Financial Conglomerates  in Italy
An intense debate has been going on in Italy for several years on the merits and
demerits of universal  banking and linkages between banks and industrial companies.  As
noted by Mario Draghi, after a long period of regulation  and sheltered existence, Italian
banks have been faced with a pressing need for restructuring  and recapitalization. Unlike
Canada, where the benefits and costs of upstream linkages were at the periphery of the
debate, the Italian debate las  focussed  on whether the necessary structural changes can be
achieved by the banking sector alone or whether they need the participation  of the industrial
sector, which has restructured itself with astonishing  success.
Draghi reviews the arguments for and against such linkages in the context of past and
recent developments  in Italian banking and the changes in EEC legislation  that are prompted
by the creation of the single European market.  He provides a brief historical  review of the
experience of universal  banking in Italy before the 1930s. The failures of that era led to the
establishment  of a rigidly controlled system that imposed  a clear separation  between short
and long-term business, between commercial  and investment  banking, and between banking
and industry.  It also led to the public ownership of large commercial  banks that co-existed
with a number of public law banks and savings banks and dominated  the Italian financial
system.
Draghi discusses  the merits and demerits of both universal  banking and upstream
linkages. He cautions that universal banking, which appears to have been quite successful  in
Germany, would not necessarily  be equally successful  if it was transplanted  into other
countries. He places particular emphasis  on the conflicts  of interest inherent in a universal
banking system and on the difficulty  of monitoring  and controlling the behavior of universal
banks.
Draghi also notes that leaders of large industrial conglomerates  have exerted
considerable  pressure for the right to acquire controlling stakes in banking institutions. The
main arguments in favor of upstream linkages are the provision of private capital and the
potential  transfer of strong management  skills.  The main arguments against are the potential
30excessive  concentration  of power, the large conflicts of interest and the burden on monitoring
and surveillance  for preventing  abuse of privileged information.
Draghi then discusses the legislative  changes prompted by the creation of the single
European market and the passing of the Second Banking  Directive  of the EEC.  He notes
that the banking directive  provides for the authorization  of universal banks with extensive
powers, subject to various risk concentration  limits, but does not preclude nonbanks from
having controlling interests in banks.  The EEC directive  does not prevent national
authorities  from imposing stricter rules on national banks but, as Draghi emphasizes, more
restrictive rules would undermine the competitive  position of national institutions.
Draghi reviews the recent legislative  changes, especially  the provisions of the so-
called Amato Law, and their impact  on the Italian banking structure.  The new law covers
the merger, transformation  and recapitalization  of Italian banks and improvements  in bank
supervision. The law authorizes  public law banks to convert themselves  into corporations.
Although  it does not promote bank privatization  as such, it states that privatization  may be
authorized if it is instrumental  in strengthening  the Italian banking system, increases its
capital, and meets public interest goals.  However, it imposes strict conditions,  such as
requiring the approval of both the Bank of Italy and the Council of Ministers and provisions
that preclude control of privatized banks by nonbanks  or by individuals.
The Amato Law in combination  with new anti-trust legislation  impose clear limits on
upstream linkages and require the creation of holding company structures for undertaking  the
various financial  activities authorized  by the second directive.  Following  the enactment  of
these laws and other changes in regulations, Italian banking has undergone  considerable
restructuring. There have been several important  bank mergers, public law banks have
changed their status into corporations  and have floated new equity on the markets, and freed
from branching  restrictions, banks have proceeded  to more than double their branch
networks. Banks have also established  specialized  securities firms.  However, Italian
banking legislation  is likely to undergo further radical change in the near future in order to
bring it into line with EEC developments.
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Despite  reservations  about  excessive  risks  and concentation  of power,  universal
banking  has been  adopted  by most  OECD  countries  as well as a growing  number  of
developing  countries,  especially  in Latin  America  and Eastern  Europe. The two major
countries,  where  universal  banking  is not yet fully  authorized,  are Japan  and the United
States. In Japan, the existence  of keiretsu  conglomerates  with strong  links between  banks,
insurance  companies  and other financial  institutions  (as well  as industrial  companies)  has
effectively  created  universal  financial  institutions.  In the United  States,  the current
administration  proposed  a radical  reform  of banking  legislation  that would  have  removed  the
legal separation  between  commercial  and investment  banking,  banking  and insurance,  and
banking  and commerce. However,  the proposed  reform  did not win congressional  support.
While  approving  universal  banking,  most  countries  have  imposed  limits  on upstream
linkages  that would  prevent  industrial  and commercial  companies  from  controlling  financial
institutions,  especially  large banks  and insurance  companies.  The one question  that remains
unresolved  regards  the structure  of universal  banking  operations. In the United  States,  the
holding  company  structure  has been  proposed  and actively  considered  as a better  structure  for
conducting  universal  banking. In a holding  company  structure,  nonbanking  activities  are
undertaken  by subsidiaries  of a parent  holding  company  rather  than by subsidiaries  of the
bank.
The arguments  for and against  the holding  company  structure  are reviewed  by Samuel
Talley. Talley  notes  that proponents  of the holding  company  structure  argue that it would
allow  the public  to derive  the benefits  of universal  banking  without  placing  the stability  of the
system  in jeopardy. This is because  clear limitations  would  be placed  on transactions
between  the bank, its parent  company  and its other subsidiaries.  For instance,  any
transactions  would  have  to be effected  on market  terms. In addition,  the holding  company
structure  would  create  a level playing  field  for both banking  and nonbanking  competitors,
while  the bank would  be protected  from risky activities  that would  be undertaken  by
nonbanking  subsidiaries.
Talley  notes,  however,  that in practice  it may  be difficult  to insulate  banks  from
holding  company  problems. The "corporate  veil" may  be pierced  if the group  is perceived
as one entity  by the courts, if problems  at the holding  company  level  affect  confidence  in the
32soundness  of the bank, and if holding company  problems  lead to adverse transactions with
the bank in violation of existing "firewall" rules.  Talley also notes that there is limited
evidence in the United States against the insulation  view.
Two ways in which a holding  company structure can avoid problems  is by creating a
fail-proof  bank (also known as "narrow" bank) and by creating a fail-proof  parent.  The fail-
proof bank proposal would force banks to separate their traditional  deposit and lending
functions. Banks accepting  deposits from the public would be confined  to investing in risk-
free assets, such as treasury bills or perhaps high quality commercial  paper.  Talley notes
that this proposal has considerable  theoretical  merit, but would require a wrenching change in
the structure and operation of the banking and financial  system.  A basic problem would
likely be that the amount of liquid bank deposits would greatly exceed the supply of risk-free
assets.
The fail-proof  parent proposal would require all risky activities to be conducted  in
nonbank subsidiaries, thus insulating  both bank and the parent company  from problems  at the
subsidiary  level.  Under this proposal, the parent company  would not be allowed to issue
debt, while the bank would not be allowed to engage in most types of transactions  with either
the parent company  or its nonbank  subsidiaries. Talley argues that the fail-proof  parent
proposal has many advantages  over the other proposals in that it would provide greater
protection to the bank and would create a level playing field for different types of activities.
Concluding Remarks
What conclusions  could be drawn from this overview  of issues in financial regulation?
The first point, which cannot be overemphasized,  is that the 1980s  was not a decade of
deregulation, but rather a period of extensive regulatory  refi rm.  There was decreased
reliance on economic regulations  that inhibit competition,  innovation  and efficiency  but an
increasing  importance  of prudential  and other regulations  that promote stability  and fairness.
Second, there is now widespread  consensus  that macroeconomic  and ailocative
regulations  may be justified under special circumstances,  but that over time there should be
greater reliance on market mechanisms  for monetary and credit control and for allocating
scarce financial  resources.
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reforms.  The contrasting  experiences  of Japar. and Chile support a cautious and gradual
approach.  Abrupt liberalization  after a long period of repressive control may be quite
dangerous - Chile had negative interest rates at least from 1945 to 1973. The experience of
Indonesia  also confirms that caution is important  but suggests that there may not exist a
unique and optimal sequence  of reforms.
Fourth, there is very strong consensus  on the importance  of prudential, organizational
and protective controls.  Although  particular types of control, such as the Basle risk-weighted
capital ratios, are sometimes  questioned, there is little disagreement on the need for capital
adequacy and for strong banking supervision. However, because of their greater uncertainty
and risks facing banks in developing  countries, they should perhaps be subject to higher
capital ratios than those recommended  under the Basle agreement.
Fifth, there is ample recognition  of the importance  of speedy and decisive  intervention
to prevent insolvent  institutions from magnifying  losses.  This is underscored  by the
experience of banking crisis and restructuring  in Malaysia, Norway and the United  States.
Sixth, the role of deposit insurance is still unclear.  It is instrumental  in protecting
small savers, but otherwise  its role in preventing bank runs, promoting competition  or
stimulating  better regulatory mechanisms  is open to serious objections. Deposit insurance
suffers from a high risk of moral hazard.
Seventh, the regulatory issues of nonbank financial  intermediaries  are very similar to
those of banks.  For life insurance companies,  price and product controls, which inhibit
competition,  are being replaced by solvency  controls.  In addition, the use of insurance (and
pension) funds for financing  large public sector debts at below-market  yields is being
replaced by investment rules that emphasize safety and profitability.
Eighth, the most controversial type of controls are still structural controls that impose
geographic or functional  limitations  on the activities of financial  institutions. There is
general agreement against geographic  restrictions, especially for institutions  operating in
areas with a common currency.  There is also a worldwide  trend in favor of universal
banking and even in favor of close links between banks and insurance, but there is generaUy
less support for cicse links between banks and industrial companies. This is particularly so
34for upstream linkages that involve industrial companies  owning or controlling large banks
and insurance companies.
Ninth, it is widely accepted that universal institutions  pose a serious challenge  on
regulators and supervisors. Countries with weak supervisory  agencies would be well advised
to promote simpler and more transparent structures, at least until they are able to strengthen
their regulatory  and supervisory mechanisms.
Tenth, despite the worldwide  trend towards universal banking, there is considerable
controversy  regarding the desirability  and benefits of this trend.  Many analysts emphasize
the difficulties  of regulation  by function and reliance on conduct rules for overcoming
excessive  risk taking, conflicts of interest and abuse of privileged information. These
analysts favor structural controls that limit the scope for fraud and mismanagement. But
other analysts argue that the threat of regulation, reputational  considerations  and provisions
for legal redress against offending institutions  would be effective in policing universal
institutions.
Is There a Role for Portfolio and Growth Limits?
Despite the acknowledged  importance  of prudential regulations,  no country appears to
have developed  a robust regulatory framework. Banks  and other financial  institutions  in a
large and growing number of countries have suffered from excessive risk taking,
mismanagement  and fraud.  Capital adequacy controls  and greater supervision  have not
succeeded  in preventing  large losses and failures, although  it is fair to say that few countries,
if any, have fully and consistently  implemented  such controls.  At the time of writing this
chapter, most Anglo-American  and Scandinavian  countries that have implemented  extensive
financial  deregulation  in the 1980s suffer from the consequences  of excessive  and uncritical
expansion  of credit as well as from widespread  mismanagement  and a significant  amount of
fraud.
One ichool of thought  attributes the phenomenon  of large and widespread financial
failures in part to a lack of experience and expertise. Mistakes have been made because,
after a long period of tight regulation, banks and other financial  institutions  have failed to
35develop adequate internal systems  of controls.  Accoruing  to this view', financial  failures
will decline in frequency as well as intensity once institutions  learn how to operate and
compete in the new deregulated  environment. To some extent, excesses occurred because
prudential regulation  and supervision  were ineffective.  Not only were incentive structures
distorted in favor of risk taking, but they failed to reward monitoring  and risk assessment.
Strengthening  supervision  and correcting the structure  of incentives  would minimize the
likelihood  of a repetition of these mistakes  in the future.
An alternative view is that there is a systemic  tendency  of financial  institutions  to
engage in destructive competition,  to assume excessive  risks and to engage in imprudent
and/or fraudulent  activities.  According  to this view, the performance  and behavior of
financial  institutions in the 1980s bears close resemblance  to the 1920s. Without the
stabilizing influence  of deposit insurance and governmental  readiness  to provide fImancial
support to avert financial  panics, the world economy might have experienced  the financial
collapse and destruction  of the Great Depression. Although macrofinancial  -ontrols for
development  purposes have clearly lost their traditional  appeal, there may be some argument
for imposing  stricter portfolio limits and especially  growth limits for purely prudential
purposes.
The rationale for such types of controls would rest on two arguments:  first, the need
to ensure adequate risk diversification;  and second, the need to ensure a smooth and
reasonably sustainable  expansion  of business. In the United States, existing prudential
controls, such as risk-based  capital ratios and limits on individual  risk concentrations, failed
to address problems  caused by high concentrations  of portfolio  risks.  In fact, many deposit
institutions  suffered from excessive  concentration  of risks.  In Texas, Colorado  and other
states, this was caused by restrictions  on interstate expansion, but in New England, where
geographic  restrictions  were less binding, the banking sector had 48% of its total loan
portfolio in real-estate-related  loans in 1990. Portfolio limits would prevent this problem or
at least ihey could require a higher capital backing for higher levels of portfolio risks.
Portfolio limits would, of course, need to take cvre of any covariance of risks between
different types of loans 10. Moreover, their introduction  and subsequent  revision would have
9  See Caprio and Atiyas (forthcoming  1992).
10 For instance, in Texas, where energy lending accounted  for a big part of bank lending,
banks diversified  their loan portfolios  by engaging  Ln  real estate  lending, despite the fact that the
36to be implemented  gradually to avoid big distortions  in the flow of credit to particular
sectors.
The rationale for placing limits on bank growth stems from the argument that fast
growing institutions  tend to suffer from managerial  problems.  Rapid expansion  stretches
management  information  and control systems".  Growth limits that would apply on an
annual as well as a longer time framework  could provide safficient  flexibility  to individual
institutions' 2, while ensuring that a spurt of rapid growth was followed  by a period of
consolidation  before resuming  a fast pace of growth.
How portfolio and growth limits could be applied without inhibiting  competition  and
undermining  efficiency  remains unclear.  However, it is an issue that is still open and could
be revisited if more traditional  controls fail to promote efficient, fair and above all stable
systems.
two sectors were highly interdependent. When the oil price collapsed,  loan losses were high on
both types of loans.
"  Research at the Federal Reserve Board identifies rapid growth as the most consistent
predictor of future bank trouble.
12  Growth regulations  could, for instance, impose  a 15%  annual limit (presumably,  in real
terms) and a 50% cumulative  rate over 5 years.  As reported by White (see Chapter 9), some
savings and loan associations  grew in the United States by 200% and 400% over the spate of
three years or less.
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